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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION IN WASHINGTON
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Although the terms accord and satsfactzon are generally used
in the conjunctive, they constitute distinct stages in the process
of discharging a cause of action. The accord, m its technical sense,
is a bilateral contract by the terms of which a creditor having a
cause of action against a debtor promises to accept and the debtor
promises to give something other than was originally due in dis-
charge of the claim.1 Performance of the accord and its accept-
ance by the creditor constitute satisfaction. 2 Generally the cause
of action is not discharged until satisfaction, although there may
be cases where discharge is complete with the formation of the
contract of accord.' A cause of action may also be discharged with-
out the necessity of an accord where the creditor accepts some
tendered performance but not in pursuance of his promise to do so.
Such unilateral contracts of discharge are closely related to accords,
and as Professor Williston has pointed out,4 antedate the recogni-
tion of bilateral contracts. Since as a practical matter the two are
closely related and often not differentiated by the courts, both are
considered in this article.
Although accord and satisfaction are generally thought of in
connection with the discharge of money debts and causes of action
arising from breach of contract, they are by no means so limited.
The discharge of judgments and claims arising from the commis-
sion of torts are equally within their scope.5
Since the accord involves an exchange of mutual promises and
must satisfy the ordinary rules of mutual assent m bilateral con-
tracts and since a unilateral contract of discharge must satisfy
the rules for formation of unilateral contracts generally, it seems
clear that an offer for discharge unsupported by consideration is
revocable at the will of the offeror. These principles are recognized
by the Washington decisions.6 The failure of some courts to recog-
1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1838; SHEPHERD, "The Executory
Accord," 26 Ill. Law Rev. 22, at page 22.
2WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, see. 1838; Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts, sec. 417 and Comment (a).
3WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1846, SHEPHERD, "The Executory Ac-
cord," 26 Ill. Law Rev. 22, at page 24, Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts, sec. 418.
W'WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, see. 1838.
See 1 Corpus Juris, pages 524-526 inclusive.
Harding Hotel Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 138 Wash.
272, 233 Pac. 276 (1925) Kahl v. Ablan, 160 Wash. 201, 294 Pac. 1010
(1931). The Washington court seems to have avoided the error pointed
out by Dean Shepherd in his article, "The Executory Accord," 26 Ill. Law
Rev. 22, viz., that of refusing relief in such cases on the ground that an
accord executory is no defense.
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nize the distinction between a mere offer for a contract of discharge
and the completed but executory accord has led to much con-
fusion.7
CONSIDERATION
The accord, being a bilateral contract, must satisfy the usual
contract requirement of consideration. This will be found in the
mutual pronses, of the debtor to render some performance, as to
pay a sum of money, deliver a chattel, or perform services, and
of the creditor to accept this performance and discharge the cause
of action. Examples of true accords are few in the Washington
decisions.8 The great majority of the cases involve offers for uni-
lateral contracts of dischargef In such cases, as in the formation
of all unilateral contracts, the doing of the act completes the con-
tract and in the act done must be found the consideration to sup-
port the pronise to discharge. Since the rule that a cause of
action might be discharged by the actual acceptance of satisfac-
tion antedated the recognition of simple contracts 0 and the formu-
lation of the doctrine of consideration, 1 the requisites of satisfac-
tion and consideration might well have varied.'2 The courts, how-
ever, Washington included, have chosen to require that the act of
satisfaction be such as would be sufficient from the consideration
standpoint to support any counter-pronse."
The consideration problem largely centers around the orthodox
rule that a smaller payment in money will support neither a prom-
ise to discharge nor a discharge of a liquidated debt.' The rule is
not popular and a minority of states have broken away from it.1
For a time it appeared that Washington might join this minority,
'See SHEPHERD, "The Executory Accord," 26 Ill. Law Rev. 22, pages
23-24.
'Rogers v. Spokane, 9 Wash 168, 37 Pac. 300 (1894) and Joyner v.
Seattle, 144 Wash. 641, 258 Pac. 479 (1927) clearly involve bilateral con-
tracts of accord. Brov. v. Kern, 21 Wash. 211, 57 Pac. 798 (1899), and
Pederson v . Tacoma, 86 Wash. 164, 149 Pac. 643 (1915) are cases which
may apparently be so classed. It is difficult or impossible to ascertain
from the facts given in many cases whether the court is dealing with a
bilateral contract of accord or an offer for a unilateral contract of dis-
charge accepted by performance.
'The check cases considered later are illustrative, the type situation
being this: D, owing C an unliquidated obligation, sends a check to C
noted "In full payment of all claims," or a check with accompanying
letter reading "I tender you my check in full settlement of your claim. If
unsatisfactory, return it to me at once."
"WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, see. 1838.
"WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1851.
2WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1851.
""Accord and satisfaction is founded on contract, and a consideration
therefor is as necessary as for any other contract."PlymoutL. Rubber Go.
v. 'West Coast Rubber Co., 131 Wash. 662, 666, 231 Pac. 25 (1924).
" WILsTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 120.
2 See the cases cited in notes, 10 Minn. Law Rev. 248, and 24 Mich.
Law Rev. 412.
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three early decisions paving the way for complete abandonment of
the orthodox rule. In the first of these cases, Brown v. Kern,"6
appeal was taken from denial by the trial court of a motion
by a joint judgment debtor for an order cancelling as to hun
the judgment. The creditor having secured a judgment against
both joint debtors agreed with each separately to accept from him
one half thereof in full satisfaction of his obligation. One paid,
the other did not, and both were here sued for the balance due.
The relief sought by the debtor who had paid was denied below on
the ground of insufficient consideration to support the agreed dis-
charge. The Supreme Court reversed the decision and on the mat-
ter of consideration said
"The general principle that the acceptance of a less
sum of money than is actually due cannot be a satisfaction
and will not operate to extinguish the whole debt, although
agreed by the creditor to be received upon such condi-
tion, seems to be well established by almost uniform au-
thority For many years, however, courts have been
dissatisfied with this rule and have refused to extend the
doctrine, but have sought to restrict the operation of the
rule whenever it was possible. It is certainly not in accord-
ance with ethics and ought not to be in accord with the
rules of law, to allow a creditor to enter into a contract to
compromise his debt or judgment, and by reason of that
compromise receive an amount of money which he could
not have received except through the medium of a com-
promise, and then allow him to violate his contract on the
plea of want of consideration and still retain the fruits of
the agreement which he made to compromise."
"However," said the court, "it is not necessary to go
so far as to overturn the established doctrine, for the
reason that, under the findings of fact, it appears that
the defendant Ridpath was unable to pay this judgment.
The creditor then had a judgment which was worthless in
the eyes of the law, and it was certainly a consideration
to him to obtain a portion of that judgment."' 7
It would seem but a step from the decision in Brown v. Kern
to an outright admission that partial payment of a debt will
1q21 Wash. 211, 57 Pac. 798 (1899).
"See Hidden v. German Savings and Loan Society, 48 Wash. 384, 93
Pac. 688 (1908), where the court enforced a promise by a mortgagee to
remit overdue interest on a note secured by mortgage, finding consider-
ation in the fact the creditor deemed itself insecure at the time the prom-
ise was made. "The respondents were then at liberty to suffer the mort-
gage to go to a foreclosure and permit the appellant to recover its indebt-
edness as it then stood as best it could. But in reliance on the promise
made (to remit some $1,500 of delinquent interest) the respondents con-
tinued in possession of the property and paid not only the overdue inter-
est which they were already obligated to pay but additional interest under
the modified agreement to the amount of more than $3,000."
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furnish consideration for the discharge of the entire claim.18
The doctrine of the Brown case was continued m Williams v.
Blumentuzl.'9 In this case a creditor, in consideration of a payment
of $100.00 and the relinquishment by the debtor of his right of
appeal, had agreed to release a judgment for a larger amount se-
cured against the debtor. In enjoining the enforcement of the
4udgment 2 0 the court said.
"Appellant contends that the judgment referred to
constitutes and is a fixed, certain, and liquidated indebt-
edness, and that the rule is that, when such a debt is due
and payable, an agreement to accept a part of the debt in
payment of the entire debt is void. The authorities cited
support this contention. This rule, however, has been se-
verely criticised in many of the states, and m other states
statutes have been passed entirely abrogating or mate-
rially modifying it. This state belongs to the former
class."
Even though the force of the decision on this point is weakened
by the presence of other consideration in the relinquishment by
the debtor of his right of appeal, the court's conclusion that the
$100.00 was sufficient consideration was unequivocal. 2'
Baldwin v. Daly 2 2 is the third of this group of cases. Again the
decision is not squarely in point, because at the time part payment
was made and accepted by the creditor the obligation (a note)
was not matured. However, the court did not find the considera-
tion in that fact, but said.
"And while it is true that courts have disagreed on the
question whether the payment of a part of a debt is a suf-
ficient consideration to support an agreement for the re-
lease of the whole, this court has taken part with the
courts holding such contracts to be founded on a sufficient
consideration " (Citing Brown v. Kern).
Apparently these cases, while never expressly overruled, have
" There was in Brown v. Kern no indication that Ridpath was insol-
vent, hence the decision cannot be explained by reference to the doctrine,
followed in some jurisdictions, that any sum paid by an insolvent debtor
is sufficient consideration for a discharge of his entire obligation. (See
cases cited in note, 24 Mich. Law Rev. 412.) Professor Williston says of
this doctrine, "There seems no proper ground for making such a distinc-
tion." (WILLso oN CONTRACTS, sec. 120, at pages 261-262.)
1 27 Wash. 24, 67 Pac. 393 (1901).
-0 The decision here and in Brown v. Kern, supra, must be taken to indi-
cate that in Washington judgments may be made the subject matter of
accord and satisfaction. There was a time when debts of record could
not be so discharged. (See WIiS=ToN ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1850.)
nAfter the statement quoted and after citation of authorities, the court
went on to say, regarding the creditor's position after acceptance of the$100, "the respondent (creditor) was bound by his contract to satisfy thejudgment when he entered into the agreement and received the money,
and no good reason can be urged why he should not be bound thereby."
"41 Wash. 416, 83 Pac. 724 (1906) See also Russell & Uo. v. Steven-
son, 34 Wash. 166, 75 Pac. 627 (1904).
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been ignored 23 and the later decisions indicate an adherence to
the orthodox rule.24
L'qusdated Clams
Washington also follows the general rules2 5 that payment by
means of something other than money will satisfy a liquidated
obligation regardless of the value of the performance rendered,
and that payment of any sum will discharge an unliquidated
claim.
2 6
" The last case approving the doctrine of Brown v. Kern is Conlan v.
Spokane Hardware Co., 117 Wash. 378, 201 Pac. 26 (1921), a case which
does not involve accord and satisfaction. An agreement to modify a
lease, reducing the rent, was held sustained by consideration because the
tenant was at the time unable to pay the amount stipulated in the lease
and threatened to abandon the property. The court construes Brown v.
Kern and the cases following it to hold: " that an obligee who agrees
to accept and accepts something less from an obligor than full satisfaction
of an obligation, rather than take a doubtful chance of enforcing full
performance, is bound by his agreement." However, in view of the deci-
sions reviewed in note 24 snfra we cannot accept this case as a reversion
to the doctrine of Brown v. Kern, particularly so because the court in the
Conlan decision relies not only on Brown v. Kern, but on other cases
wherein there was consideration under the orthodox rule. Also, the courts
generally appear willing to go a long way in an effort to uphold rent-
reducing modifications of leases. See note, 43 A. L. R. 1451.
-"The court concludes, in Anderson v. Sanitary Dairy, 160 Wash. 647,
295 Pac. 925 (1931) without discussion, that "The payment of a less
amount than the liquidated demand was not a discharge of the whole."
Similarly, in Champagne v. McDonald, 141 Wash. 617, 251 Pac. 874 (1927),
an action to recover the agreed discount after payment of the entire debt,
recovery was denied, the court saying: "From the evidence, we are unable
to find any consideration for the ten per cent reduction agreement. The
five thousand five hundred dollars was due and payable at the time it was
made. By making this agreement, no benefit moved to McDonald. No
detriment operated against the Terhunes, as they were only doing what
they were already under obligation to do."
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, secs. 121 and 128. For a compilation of all
the Washington decisions involving consideration in contracts, see Restate-
ment of the Law of Contracts with Annotations to the Washington De-
cisions, 7 Wash. Law Rev. 391, and 8 Wash. Law Rev. 20.
2" The present position of the Washington court on the matter of con-
sideration in accord and satisfaction is well set forth in Plymouth Rubber
Co. v. West Coast Rubber Co., note 13 supra. Starting on page 666, the
court says: "One rule of law with reference to accord and satisfaction,
which has been adopted by this court, is that, if a claim or indebtedness
is liquidated and undisputed, and is due and owing, payment by the debtor
and receipt by the creditor of any amount of money less than the whole
amount of the indebtedness will not discharge the balance if the
indebtedness is unliquidated and is disputed, payment by the debtor of
an amount less than that claimed by the creditor, and receipt by the latter
of such amount under such circumstances as that he is bound to know
that the intention was to make the payment in full of all demands, will
discharge the whole claim, if the indebtedness is liquidated and undis-
puted, and the debtor tenders something other than money, or both
money and other property, and the tender is made under such circum-
stances as that the creditor is bound to know that it is made in full pay-
ment acceptance by the creditor of the tender will discharge the
indebtedness." See also Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Harmon, 126 Wash.
25, 217 Pac. 8 (1923) and Pederson v. Tacoma, 86 Wash. 164, 149 Pac. 643
(1915). It will be noted that the question of whether an obligation is or
is not liquidated may become very important. This point is discussed
later in connection with check cases.
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While it is held generally that liquidated debts may as well be
discharged by accord and satisfaction 27 as unliquidated claims, and
while there are Washington cases so holding,28 there is language in
two of our decisions which might be construed as denying this
proposition. In Farley v. Letterman" the defendant offered in evi-
dence a letter from the plaintiff at variance with the terms of a
lease executed between the parties, In ruling on the adissibility
of this letter the court said.
"The court (below) admitted this evidence on the
theory of an accord and satisfaction. This was a mistaken
conception for the reason that an accord and satisfaction
cannot arise until there exists some difference or contro-
versy between the parties thereto."
There is similar language in London Guaranty & Accident Co.
v. Western Smelting & Power Co., 0 where a defense of accord
and satisfaction was predicated on the sending of a cheek by the
debtor and its acceptance by the creditor. The defendant, owing
several years' back premium on a compensation insurance account,
as well as advance premium on a renewal policy, sent the plaintiff
a check in the amount of the advance premium together with a
letter reading- "I take pleasure in enclosing herewith cheque
in full payment of our account." The defense was demed, the
court saying-
"it is difficult to perceive there has been any accord
and satisfaction whatever. There was no dispute between
the parties nor controversy of any kind shown by the
record."
While the result was proper in each case, the reason assigned
that there was no controversy or dispute between the parties can-
not be supported.3 ' Dispute or controversy as to the obligation
or the amount of it may be of importance in determining whether
there is consideration, but should not, it is submitted, determine
whether the claim may be discharged by accord and satisfaction.
CLiMs NOT SUBJECT TO DISCnARGE By ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
Where public policy dictates the enforcement of a statutory
minimum sum to be exacted by the creditor in certain situations,
the parties cannot by accord and satisfaction discharge the obliga-
" See Restatement of the Law of Contracts, sec. 417, Comment (a).
2Brown v. Kern, note 8 supra, Williams v. Blumenthal (judgment),
note 8 supra; Baldwn-mv. Daly (note), note 22 supra.
87 Wash. 641, 152 Pac. 515 (1915).
117 Wash. 568, 201 Pac. 914 (1921).
It is doubtful if the court here really intended to announce a rule
that only unliquidated or disputed claims could be the sub3ect of accord
and satisfaction. If so, it has been overruled by Plymouth Rubber Co. v.
West Coast Rubber Co., note 18 supra, where a defense of accord and sat-
isfaction was sustained in an action on a liquidated debt.
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tion for a lesser sum. In Larsen v. RWe 32 plaintiff sued to recover
the difference between a contract salary of $3.00 per week and the
amount she conceived to have been due her because of Rem. Comp.
Stat. see. 6571-1 et seq. (Now Rem. Rev. Stat. sec. 7639 et seq),
providing for minimum salaries for women. Defendant as an af-
firmative defense alleged that before suit was filed plaintiff de-
manded of him the amount here claimed (the difference between
$3.00 per week and the statutory mimmum, totaling several hun-
dred dollars) and that in consideration of $40.00 then paid by him,
she discharged her claim. This defense was denied on the ground
that public policy requires payment of a living wage to wage-
earners, and although compromises are favored, a compromise
executed after accrual of a substantial sum due the employee be-
cause of wage payments much less than the required minimum,
which compromise did not secure to the employee the full amount
of such accrued wages, could not be supported. Similarly, in
Robmnson v. Wolverton Auto Bus Company3 the plaintiff, receiver
for a ferry company, recovered the difference between tariff rates
as filed by the ferry company with the state, and the sum actually
paid by the defendant. A defense of accord and satisfaction was
denied on the ground that the tariff rates, once fixed, could not,
by statute, be varied by agreement between the parties.
CHECK CASES
(A) Consideratwn
The defense of accord and satisfadtion seems to be raised most
frequently in Washington in cases where the debtor claims a dis-
charge of his obligation as a result of his creditor's cashing a check
sent as payment in full. The creditor claims a balance due and
that the check was a payment on account only Such cases raise
problems of both mutual assent and consideration. Whether there
is consideration depends upon whether the obligation was un-
liquidated. If liquidated, the check for less than the full amount
due cannot be made a basis for accord and satisfaction, the usual
rule of consideration applying.34 Where the obligation is liqui-
dated, notations on a check for part of the sum due, or in an accom-
panying letter, stating that the check is tendered as payment in
full of all claims, are ineffective. The creditor does not prejudice
himself by cashing the cheek, with or without notification to the
debtor that he accepts the payment as on account only In Rhodes
v. Tacoma3 ' plaintiff had for months received pay checks upon
which was printed "All endorsements on this check are an ac-
2100 Wash. 642, 171 Pac. 1037 (1918).
"163 Wash. 160, 300 Pac. 533 (1931).
1, See note 24 supra.
"5 97 Wash. 341, 166 Pac. 647 (1917).
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knowledgement of payment in full for services rendered to the
city of Tacoma as per roll, line and month on the reverse side
hereof." A city ordinance fixed plaintiff's salary at $200 per
month and he had been paid only $150 per month. Referring to a
defense of accord and satisfaction pleaded by the defendant in an-
swer to plaintiff's action to collect $50.00 per month additional
salary for the period of his completed employment, the court said
" the salary of his office is fixed and certain in
amount, there being no dispute as to the time he was an
incumbent of the office, it would seem that any such. al-
leged accord and satisfaction would be without consid-
eration. True, the city paid him $150.00 monthly, but its
obligation so to do was absolute. It thereby paid him no
more than it was at all events bound in law to pay him.
So it is easy to see that it gave him nothing in considera-
tion of any accord and satisfaction.' '
There is, however, consideration for the discharge of a liquidated
obligation where property is given the creditor in addition to the
check for part of the sum due."
The Washington court apparently has not attempted to define
"unliquidated obligation," and examination of the decisions does
not reveal any type situation which can be relied on as definitive
of the term. Professor Williston defines it as "one the amount
of which has not been fixed by agreement or cannot be exactly
determined by the application of rules of arithmetic or of law."
Tort clains are clearly unliquidated. A bonw fide dispute as to the
amount owed on a contract makes the obligation thereon unliqui-
dated.19 'Where the amount of the obligation is fixed and undis-
21 The court in Glenz v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 125 Wash. 650, 216 Pac.
842 (1923) had before it facts analogous to those in the Rhoes case. After
agreement by defendant with its employees for payment of time and a half
for overtime, the plaintiff worked for months, regularly putting in over-
time, and was paid at regular rates only. Each check bore this notation:
"In full for wages to and including - " (period of time covered by the
check being inserted). A defense of accord and satisfaction was entered
against the employee's action to recover the excess due for the overtime.
Defendant appealed from motions for directed verdict denied below. The
court refused to upset the verdict for plaintiff below and dwelt at some
length on the fact that intent of the parties is in such cases a matter for
the jury, but said nothing whatever about consideration.
11 Plymouth, Rubber Co. v. West Coast Rubber Co., note 13 supra, North.-
ern Bank d- Trust Co. v. Harmon, note 26 supra.
'WLLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 128. Professor Williston also distin-
guishes "disputed" from "unliquidated" claims. The former term evi-
dently applies to situations where the existence of any obligation at all
is disputed; the obligation if existing may be either liquidated or un-
liquidated. Tie distinction is not material here, it being conceded that
for the purposes of consideration there is no difference.
"Pederson v. Tacoma, note 26 supra (claim for extras under a construc-
tion contract) James -v. Riverszde Lusmber Co., 121 Wash. 130, 208 Pac.
260 (1922) (claim for services by an architect) Hei7and u. Grunbaum,
171 Wash. 148, 17 Pac. (2d) 864 (1933) (dispute over the provisions of a
stock purchasing agreement).
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puted but a counter-claim is demanded by the debtor and dis-
puted by the creditor, the entire obligation is unliquidated. In
Hotel Randolph Co. v. John C Watrous Co.40 plaintiff sued for
$500.00 allegedly owed by defendant on account of collections made
by him for plaintiff. The defense of accord and satisfaction was
based on the plaintiff's acceptance of a check tendered as full set-
tlement of his claim. It appeared that defendant collected for
plaintiff's account some $975.00, and claiming that plaintiff owed
it $500.00 in connection with another transaction, sent along a
check for the difference, together with an itemized statement show-
ing their computations and the charge of $500.00, the statement
being noted "Check to balance." Plaintiff cashed the check. Said
the court.
"We think this case is governed by the rule laid down
in First Natwnal Bank of Ritzville v. White-Dulaney
Company In that case, on facts very similar to those
in this case, the court, after recognizing the general rule
applicable to debts which are liquidated and due, deliber
ately adopted the majority rule to the effect that a claimed
offset in dispute will render the whole debt unliquidated.
So here, appellant was well advised, before it cashed the
check, of the claimed offset, and being a party to the dis-
pute, well knew it existed, and, we think, to hold that
there was no accord and satisfaction here would be to,
in effect, overrule the White-Dulaney case, which we are
unwilling to do."
Although it is the general rule that where part of an obliga-
tion is disputed and part admitted, payment by the debtor of the
part admitted is sufficient consideration for the creditor's dis-
charge of his entire clam, 41 there are two early Washington
decisions contra. The court in Seattle, Renton, etc., R. Co. v. Seat-
tle-Tacoma Power C0.42 had for consideration an alleged accord
and satisfaction founded on payment each month by the plaintiff of
an amount provided in the contract as the minimum monthly
charge for electric power. Plaintiff sought an injunction against
a threatened shut-off of power by the defendant, who claimed fail-
ure by plaintiff to pay power bills in excess of the minimum
amount. The court said
"It may be safely asserted that, underlying all appli-
144 Wash. 216, 257 Pac. 629, 53 A. L. R. 766 (1927) In First Nationai
B nk v. White-Dulaney Co., 123 Wash. 220, 212 Pac. 262 (1923), the coun-
ter-claim was based on sacks sold the plaintiff's assignor, the original cred-
itor. The court cited 1 C. J. 556 and 1 R. C. L, 198 and concluded that the
obligation was unliquidated. Professor Williston says: " if there
are cross claims between the parties, if either claim is unliquidated, or the
subject of bona fide and reasonable dispute, since the balance due on ad-justment of the claims is uncertain, any payment will support an agree-
ment to cancel both claims." (WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 129.)
"W LISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 129.
'-63 Wash. 639, 116 Pac. 289 (1911).
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cation of the rule of accord and satisfaction, in cases of
both liqmdated and unliquidated accounts, where the
creditor is absolutely and m any event entitled to receive
a definite and fixed sum, but claims an additional sum to
be his due, which additional sum only is disputed by the
debtor, the payment by the debtor of the definite and fixed
debt and its acceptance by the creditor, though tendered
as payment in full, will not constitute an accord and
satisfaction.4 3
The rule here announced was approved in Thayer v. Harbt-
can.
44
There is, however, in a later case a dictum which seems to follow
the general rule. 5 Just what the Washington court would now
'3 Professor Williston, after indicating the general rule on this point,
goes on to say- "Though the courts seem to have failed to observe the dis-
tinction between a wholly unliquidated claim of at least a specified value
and a claim where there is a distinct obligation to pay a liquidated
amount as part of an entire contract, the distinction is clearly recognized
between either of such cases on the one hand, and a case where a debtor
is liable under two distinct contracts, on the other hand. If the debtor
owes a liquidated amount, the fact that he owes on another contract an
unliquidated or disputed amount, will not make payment of the former
sufficient consideration for an agreement to discharge the latter, or in-
deed for any other promise."' (WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, see. 129.)
"170 Wash. 278, 126 Pac. 625 (1912). Here plaintiff sued to recover
attorney fees alleged to have totalled $1,023.89. Defendant had sent plain-
tiff a check for $50.00 upon which was the notation, "This is payment in
full for your services. " Plaintiff drew a line through this notation
and wrote in "Accepted as part payment of attorney fees " and cashed
the check. The services had been rendered in connection with a mortgage
foreclosure; the defendant in settling with the mortgagor exacted $300.00
as attorney fees. Proceeding from the rule that in such mortgage cases
the entire fee collected from the mortgagor must go to the attorney, the
court stated: "There could, hence, be no 'bona fide dispute that that sum
($300.00) at least was due to the appellant. The rule that where a claim
is in dispute and the debtor sends a check to the creditor for a less sum,
indorsed as payment in full of the claim, the retention of the check by
the creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction, has no application to
the case here presented. That rule only applies where the claim is dis-
puted in good faith, and only as to the part of the claim so disputed.
This case falls within the rule announced in Seattle, Renton, etc., R. Co. V.
Seatte-Taconur Power Co. The respondent having collected from the
mortgagor $300.00 as an attorney's fee, could not dispute the attorney's
right to that amount. Up to that amount, the claim was thenceforth
liquidated and indisputable. The acceptance thereafter of a less sum by
the attorney could not form the basis of or operate as a consideration for
an accord and satisfaction." Granted that the case is distinguishable on
its facts from the Seattle-Tacoma Power Co. case and might well have
been decided solely on the ground that a lesser payment in cash will not
discharge a liquidated debt, the earlier case is certainly relied on here.
43 Pederson v. Tacoma, note 26 supra. The court having found as a fact
in that case that the parties agreed on the sum of $61,342.79 as settlement
for extras under a construction contract, plaintiff having claimed more
and the city having claimed less was due, answered plaintiff's contention
that defendant had admitted $61,342.79 was due and hence such sum
could not support accord and satisfaction by saying: "But if we may
assume that the city agreed that $61,342.79 was due and that the appellant
was claiming $108,000, the parties might agree upon either sum, and that
would be an accord and satisfaction. Where a claim is in dispute, the
parties may agree upon an amount to be paid, which amount when paid
will constitute an accord and satisfaction."
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hold in a case raising squarely the issue of whether payment of
the liquidated portion of a claim which is disputed in part, is con-
sideration for discharge of all of it, is problematical. There appears
to be a tendency away from the technical rules of consideration
and the dictum indicated above at least offers a starting point for
abandonment of the rule announced in the earlier decisions.46
(B) Mutual Assent
The element of mutual assent requisite to the formation of the
contract of discharge in check cases is sometimes difficult to deter-
mine and set out clearly Assuming a proper condition has been
appended to the check or made known to the creditor in some other
way, the debtor in effect has said, "Here is my check for so much.
I tender it in full satisfaction of your claim. If you are unwilling
to accept it on that condition and to discharge your claim, return
the check to me." The creditor may then follow one of several
courses. He may acknowledge acceptance of the remittance as
satisfaction, he may cash the check, saying nothing; he may cash
the check but advise the debtor that the proceeds are being applied
on account only, or he may simply retain the check uncashed.
Express acceptance of the check as satisfaction clearly supplies
the promise necessary to complete the unilateral contract of dis-
charge. Where the check is cashed and nothing said, such prom-
ise may be implied. So also where the check is retained an un-
reasonable time. Where the check is cashed but the condition is
expressly denied, the element of mutual assent would seem to be
entirely lacking. However, for reasons of policy, by the general
"Movement toward a change may be indicated by James v. Riverside
Lumber Co., note 39 supra. Plaintiff, an architect, had prepared two
sets of plans in connection with construction of a building for the defend-
ant and submitted a bill, itemized and with separate amounts charged
for each set. Defendant sent a check for the amount charged for one
plan and denied liability for the other. Plaintiff cashed the check and
lost this action to recover for the other plans, defendant's defense of
accord and satisfaction being sustained. The court concludes that "the
various claims were so interwoven as to constitute an unliquidated de-
mand and when coupled with the contentions made by appellants, and
which they introduced testimony to support, show that none of this claim
was in fact liquidated, " It would seem from the facts the court
might readily have found the claim liquidated In so far as the amount
due for the set of plans paid for was concerned. In a later case, Bottorff
v. A. E. Page Machinery Co., 74 Wash. Dec. 401, 24 Pac. (2d) 1059 (1933),
the court seems to follow the same general approach as was used in James
'v. Riverside LAumber Co., and reaches the same conclusion, viz., that the
entire claim was unliquidated, hence there was consideration to support
accord and satisfaction. Again, from the facts the court would have been
justified in finding part of the claim liquidated and part unliquidated. It
will be noted that by construing the facts so as to find the entire claim
unliquidated, the ultimate result achieved is the same as would be
reached in a jurisdiction adhering to the general rule on consideration.
It may be that the court, loath to overrule the earlier Washington deci-
sions, has adopted this method of bringing Washington into line with
the weight of authority on the point.
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rule the creditor who has cashed the check tendered him condi-
tionally may not thereafter deny discharge of the obligation.47
(C) Conditional Tender
Just what language is necessary to create a condition which will
bind the creditor upon his cashing or retaining the check is not
indicated by the Washington decisions. It is clear that a condition
must be attached to the tender; otherwise the creditor may regard
the payment as on account only In O'Connell v. Arai" an action
for unlawful detainer, a defense of accord and satisfaction was
interposed. Six hundred dollars rent had accrued and defendant,
the tenant, claiming $140.00 deduction on account of sidewalk re-
pairs which had disturbed his occupancy, sent plaintiff a check
for $460.00 with a letter setting forth his claim and stating, "You
will find enclosed check for $460.00 rent for month of June, 1910,
the balance of $140.00 being retained in satisfaction of the above
claim." Plaintiff cashed the cheek and denied the deduction. Said
the court.
"This check was not tendered to the plaintiff condition-
ally The plaintiff denied the right of defendant to
make the reduction The acceptance of the check under
these conditions did not constitute an accord and satis-
faction. "
So also, in Three Rivers Growers' Association v. Pacific Fruit &
Produce Company'9 where the debtor, having purchased several
cars of berries and having been unable to dispose of all of them at a
profit, sent the creditor a cheek for less than the total debt, noted
"Inclosed herewith is our check number 17587 for $3,675.00, repre-
senting the net returns on A. R. C. 597. We were able to sell 770 at
f. o. b. price of $4.00; 270 we sold at $2.50 f. o. b. We have deducted
from this our ten-cent brokerage, out of which we have paid our
broker in. Calgary $25.00." After finding as a fact that defendant
was a purchaser and not an agent of plaintiff, the court concludes
"It (defendant) did not then inform the respondent
that it intended the check to be a payment in full, nor was
the remittance accompanied by any act or declaration
which would amount to a condition that the money ten-
dered, if accepted, would be accepted as a satisfaction infull."3
Plaintiff recovered the difference between the contract price and
the amount remitted, over a defense of accord and satisfaction
based on the cheek.
'WIL=STON ON CoNTnACTs, sees. 1854, 1855 and 1856, Restatement of
the Law of Contracts, sec. 420; LeDoux v. Seattle, etc., Shzpbuilding Go.,
114 Wash. 632, 195 Pac. 1006 (1921) James v. Riverssde Lumber Co., note
39 supra. But notice the language in Ingram v. Sauset, note 51, snfra.
"63 Wash. 280,115 Pac. 95 (1911).
"159 Wash. 572, 294 Pac. 233 (1930).
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A defense of accord and satisfaction was denied in Ingram v.
Sauseto on the ground that the debtor's remittance was not
tendered conditionally Here the creditor had a claim for services
rendered, the amount due being in dispute. The debtor prepared
a statement of what he considered to be the true account and sent
it to the creditor with a check for the balance shown on the state-
ment. The check was cashed and this action started to recover an
additional amount. During the trial the creditor testified he re-
ceived the idea from the statement and check that the remittance
was intended by the debtor to be payment in full, but being un-
willing to so accept it, he left the check with his attorney with
instructions to cash it only if upon investigation he found it could
be accepted as payment on account only The court refused to find
in the debtor's subjective intent any condition, despite the fact the
creditor was aware of that intent. " no conditions accompanied
it (the check) and there was nothing to indicate that it might not,
in the event the payee declined to accept it as full payment be
applied on account. "51
As indicative of what will constitute a condition, there is the
statement in Le Doux v. Seattle, etc., Shipbuilding Company52 that.
" where a debtor sends to his creditor a check
and at that time informs the creditor that he intends the
check to be considered as full payment, then, by the ac-
ceptance and cashing of the check, the creditor agreed to
settlement. "
What language or conduct of the debtor will satisfy this require-
ment that he "nform the creditor that he ntends the check as full
settlement?" The following situations have been held to involve a
conditional tender. In James v. Riverside Lumber Company5 3 the
defendant had before it plaintiff's statement for services ren-
dered in preparing two sets of building plans and sent a check for
the amount which, according to the statement, was due for one of
the plans, with this letter
"It is our understanding that the duties of an architect
include the getting up of plans which are satisfactory to
their customer. It is necessary often times to submit sev-
10121 Wash. 444, 209 Pac. 699 (1922)
11 The court went on, after the sentence quoted, "Second, there is noth-
ing in the record to indicate that respondent accepted the check as full
payment. He testified that he would not, and did not, so consider it,
and his acts in taking it to his attorney with directions to cash it only if
it could be applied on account bear out his testimony. Hence there was
no meeting of the minds, no agreement to compromise, and no accord and
satisfaction." What would the result have been had the court found as a
fact the debtor had conditioned his payment? See also In this connection
Peterson v. Jahn Contracting Co., 96 Wash. 210, 164 Pac. 937 (1917) and
Inman v. W E. Roche Fruit Co., 162 Wash. 235, 298 Pac. 342 (1931).
5 Note 47, supra.
5 Note 39, supra.
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eral different plans, the one most suitable being carried
out, and this being the one upon which any compensation
would be based. We are therefore eliminating from your
statement the item of $225.00 for plan No. 1, which was
never executed. (we) decline to consider the first item
of thins charge."
Said the court. " when respondent accepted the check with
the conditions under which it was tendered, he must be deemed
to be bound by those conditions."
Although the facts in the case of First National Bank v. White-
Dvianey Company54 are not entirely clear on the point, the condi-
tion there was apparently in the form of an oral statement, by the
debtor as the check was handed to the creditor's representative,
that the check was in full settlement of the account. And in
Northern Bank & Trust Company v. Harmon"l a condition was
found in the fact that the debtor's remittance "was paid to the
(creditor's) then attorneys as a tender of full payment and satis-
faction.'* HAROLD SHEPHRD.*
WARREN SHATTUCK. " *
"Note 40,"supra.
Note 26, supra.
*To be continued.
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The American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law of Contracts with Annotations to
the Washington Decisions*
Chapter 5
DUTIES AND RIGHTS WHERE MORE PERSONS THAN
ONE ARE PROMISORS OR PROMISEES OF THE
SAME PERFORMANCE**
Section 117. DuTY oF A JOINT PROMISOR, JOINDER OF CO-
PR0MIS0RS.
Each person bound by a joint promise is bound for the
whole performance thereof, but by making appropriate
objection can prevent recovery of judgment against him
unless there are joined as defendants all promisors who
were originally jointly bound with him, except such of
them as are at the time of suit dead or beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court.
*The absence of annotations to particular sections of the Restatement
indicates that no Washington decisions have been found on the principle
therein stated.
**Continued from last issue.
